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Abstract 
This empirical study seeks to identify determinants of the underground economy in the U.S. in the 
form of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion over the period 1975-2008, with a specific 
focus upon the net impact of higher federal income tax rates on personal income tax evasion. In this 
study, we use the most recent data available on aggregate personal income tax evasion, data that are 
derived from the General Currency Ratio Model and measured in the form of the ratio of 
unreported AGI to reported AGI. Most other studies of federal income tax evasion for the U.S. do 
not use data this current. It is found that the impact of increases in the federal income tax rate on 
aggregate personal income tax evasion may, on balance, be ambiguous, possibly suggesting that the 
income effect is negative and outweighs the positive substitution effect for the representative 
taxpayer. It is also found that the degree of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion may be 
an increasing function of the percentage of federal personal income tax returns characterized by 
itemized deductions and a decreasing function of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (during the first two 
years of implementation), the ratio of the tax free interest rate yield on high grade municipals to the 
interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes, and higher audit rates of filed federal income tax 
returns (as a measure of risk from tax evasion) by IRS personnel. Finally, unpopular wars may 
provide a secondary benefit for and therefore act as an inducement for greater tax evasion.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Studies of income tax evasion behavior essentially fall into three categories. First, there are the 
principally theoretical models of tax evasion behavior, such as Allingham and Sandmo (1972), 
Falkinger (1988), Klepper, Nagin, and Spurr (1991), Das-Gupta (1994), Pestieau, Possen, and 
Slutsky (1994), and Caballe and Panades (1997). As a rule, most such studies are not empirical in 
nature, but they potentially can provide insights into new variables that might influence tax evasion 
behavior in the aggregate. Second, there are a number of studies that either (a) use questionnaires or 
(b) undertake experiments, such as Spicer and Lundstedt (1976), Spicer and Thomas (1982), Baldry 
(1987), Alm, Jackson, and McGee (1992), Thurman (1991), and Alm, McClelland, and Schulze 
(1999). These studies are empirical in nature, deriving the data largely (if not entirely) from the 
experiments, and also potentially can provide insights into new variables that might influence tax 
evasion behavior in the aggregate. Certain of these studies indicate an aversion to the prospect of 
being audited while others reveal a lack of such risk-averse behavior; still others imply that 
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taxpayers may be averse to tax evasion on moral grounds. Third, there are those studies that largely 
or in some cases exclusively adopt what is referred to as "official data,” i.e., data obtained from the 
IRS (or its counterpart outside of the U.S.) and/or some other “official source,” i.e., a credible 
government agency. Among the types of information thusly obtained and analyzed are data on 
income tax evasion, income tax rates, penalties assessed on detected unpaid income taxes, and 
audit rates. Such studies endeavor typically either seek to estimate the relative extent of tax evasion 
or to identify determinants thereof (Tanzi, 1982, 1983; Clotfelter, 1983; Carson, 1984; Crane and 
Nourzad, 1987; Poterba, 1987; Pyle, 1989; Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Feige, 1994,1996; Joulaian 
and Rider, 1996; Cebula, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2011, 2013; Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett, 2001; Alm and 
Yunus, 2009; Cebula, Coombs, and Yang, 2009).  
In the empirical literature, it has often been found that the degree of federal personal income 
tax evasion is positively affected by income tax rates (Tanzi, 1982; Clotfelter, 1983; Crane and 
Nourzad, 1987; Poterba, 1987; Feige, 1994; Joulaian and Rider, 1996; Cebula, 1997, 2001, 2004, 
2011, 2013). Interestingly, Yaniv (1994) characterizes Clotfelter (1983) as “the most relevant 
study” with respect to the impact of income tax rates on tax evasion, whereas Cox (1984) questions 
his findings. In any event, in a purely static framework, this perspective appears simple and 
straightforward, namely, the higher the income tax rate, the greater the benefit (in terms of a 
reduced tax liability) from not reporting taxable income, ceteris paribus. However, as observed by a 
number of scholarly papers, including Crane and Nourzad (1986), Caballe and Panades (2007), 
Gahramanov (2009), and Freire-Seren and Panades (2013), there is an apparent contradiction 
between the empirical evidence on the response of taxpayers to increased or decreased income tax 
rates and the predictions of theoretical models of income tax evasion. In other words, on theoretical 
grounds it can be argued that the effect of, say, an increase in the income tax rate on income tax 
evasion is ambiguous. For example, it follows from Crane and Nourzad (1986) that the net 
response of tax evasion to a change in the tax rate depends upon the relative strength of the 
substitution and income effects of a tax rate change.  
The purpose of this exploratory study is two-fold. First, it seeks to add to the rich literature 
on income tax evasion by identifying key determinants of aggregate federal personal income tax 
evasion in the U.S. using data up to and including the year 2008. For the most part, earlier studies 
of aggregate tax evasion in the U.S. do not go beyond the year 1997, althlough the recent study 
by Cebula (2013) uses official IRS data that estimate the “AGI gap” approach that run through 
the year 2005. Thus, by investigating tax evasion through 2008, the study period is more current 
than the nearly all of the existing published literature. Second, it provides a number of empirical 
estimates of aggregate income tax evasion that adopt two alternative income tax rate measures in 
the effort to provide information that may be pertinent to the controversy and debate concerning 
the actual net response of aggregate income tax evasion to, say, an increase in the tax rate, 
depending upon the relative strengths of the substitution and income effects of a tax rate change.  
 It is noteworthy that focusing on aggregate income tax evasion and its determinants 
permits the analysis of actual (official) as opposed to hypothetical or experimental tax evasion data 
and also permits the analysis of a variety of actual real-world explanatory variables; furthermore, 
the aggregate time-series approach adopted in this study permits analysis of aggregate federal 
personal income tax evasion over time.  Finally, the use of aggregate data can provide researchers 
and policymakers with a convenient tool for estimating the lost tax revenues resulting from tax 
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evasion and potential tax receipts increases that various public policies can potentially generate; 
indeed, policymakers arguably might well be much more interested in the results from aggregative 
analysis using official data because such information may be easier to present to elected officials 
seeking to enact new legislation to limit income tax evasion.       
The framework/model is presented in Section II. Section III provides the formal empirical 
analysis. These estimates first consist of OLS (ordinary least squares) results and, as a test of 
robustness, subsequently of 2SLS (two stage least squares) results. Section IV provides a summary 
of the study findings and certain policy observations.   
 
II. A Benefit-Cost Model of Under-Reporting Taxable Income 
 
In this study, the relative probability that the representative economic agent will under-report 
his/her taxable income to the IRS (pur) is treated as an increasing function of the expected gross 
benefits to the agent of under-reporting taxable income, egb, and as a decreasing function of the 
expected gross costs to the agent of under-reporting taxable income, egc. Thus, the ratio of the 
probability of under-reporting taxable income to the IRS, pur, to the probability of fully reporting 
taxable income1 to the IRS, (1-pur), is described for the representative economic agent by: 
 
pur/(1-pur) = f(egb, egc), such that fegb > 0, fegc < 0     (1) 
 
Expressing the probabilities described in equation (1) in relative terms possesses the virtue that it 
thereby reflects the form of the tax evasion data, i.e., data where (as described in Section III) the 
aggregate degree of federal personal income tax evasion is expressed in such relative terms. 
Needless to say, these probabilities, pur and (1- pur), can differ from one taxpayer to another. The 
aggregative approach adopted here, like that of its predecessors, effectively is a de facto average of 
those probabilities and is not perfect. 
 
Expected Direct Benefits of Under-Reporting Taxable Income 
 
Arguably, on a superficial static level, an example of potential expected benefits from income tax 
evasion could simply be the value of the taxes not paid to the IRS (Internal Revenue Service). To 
the extent that an individual engages in income tax evasion and underpays income taxes by, say, 
$X, those $X are a direct benefit to the individual, who can (in theory) spend and/or save the $X. It 
follows that the higher the marginal federal income tax rate that the individual is subject to, the 
greater the pecuniary benefit from underreporting his or her income. For instance, if the maximum 
marginal income tax rate for the taxpayer in question is 10%, tax evasion in the amount of $5,000 
potentially would be expected to yield the tax evader $500; however, if the taxpayer in question 
faced an increased/higher percent income tax rate, say 40%, the expected direct benefit of this same 
degree of tax evasion would appear to be $2,000. Thus, it might be logical to deduce that, ceteris 
paribus, the higher the maximum marginal income tax rate faced by a taxpayer, the greater the 
incentive to engage in income tax evasion because the higher that income tax rate, the greater the 
expected benefits of the tax evasion behavior. Clearly, the probability of underreporting income 
                     
1 Fully reporting all taxable income is complete income tax compliance. 
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may differ by income level and from one person to another, even with the same income. The way in 
which the tax evasion data are gathered reflects a de facto average response of taxpayers to tax-
evasion incentives and influences.   
 However, from a more rigorous theoretical perspective, it can be hypothesized that the 
effect of an income tax rate change on income tax evasion is actually ambiguous (Crane and 
Nourzad, 1986; Caballe and Panades, 2007; Gahramanov, 2009; Freire-Seren and Panades, 2013). 
The sign on the partial derivative of tax evasion with respect to the income tax rate theoretically 
depends upon the relative strengths of the substitution effect associated with the tax rate change on 
the one hand and the income effect associated with the tax rate change on the other hand. Assume 
an income tax rate increase is implemented. On the one hand, the substitution effect, which is 
always positive, implies an increased incentive to engage in greater income tax evasion. As Freire-
Seren and Panades (2013, p. 810) observe, “This effect generates incentives to substitute tax 
evasion for honesty.” On the other hand, under the assumed income tax rate increase, the income 
effect could either be positive or negative, depending upon the taxpayer’s attitude towards, i.e., 
tolerance of, risk of detection for tax evasion by the IRS. If the income effect is positive, then the 
taxpayer will likely engage in increased income tax evasion as a reaction to the tax rate increase. 
However, if the income effect is negative and if it outweighs/dominates the positive substitution 
effect, then the partial derivative of tax evasion with respect to the income tax rate is negative. 
Consequently, the theory implies that, ceteris paribus, the net effect of an income tax increase on 
tax evasion may well be ambiguous.  
 This study seeks provide potential insight into the actual net impact of higher income tax 
rates on income tax evasion in the economy as a whole. To reflect the federal personal income tax 
rate, this study adopts two different measures of the federal personal income tax rate: the maximum 
marginal federal personal income tax rate (MAXMARGTX)2 and the average effective personal 
income tax rate (AVETXRATE). Arguably some very recent related research on aggregate personal 
income tax evasion has used a maximum marginal tax rate and found it to exercise a positive and 
statistically significant impact on personal income tax evasion (Alm and Yunus, 2009; Cebula, 
2011, 2013); interestingly, unlike the other studies of aggregate income tax evasion, the study by 
Cebula (2011) provides autoregressive (AR) estimates.  In any event, it is observed that these two 
tax rate measures are considered in separate estimates because they are rather highly correlated, i.e., 
r(AVETXRATE, MAXMARGTX) = 0.631.  
Aside from empirically investigating the substitution effect-income effect controversy at the 
aggregate level, this exploratory study seeks to provide contemporary insights into other potential 
income tax evasion determinants. For example, in the U.S., Form A of Schedule 1040 provides a 
variety of itemized deductions types that enable the taxpayer ultimately to reduce his/her taxable 
income. These include allowances for medical expenses, state and local government taxes, 
mortgage interest payments, charitable contributions, and other such outlays. The larger the 
pecuniary value of these deductions, the lower the taxable income of the taxpayer. Furthermore, 
given the rather varied, numerous, and sometimes complex forms of these deductions, and given 
                     
2 This particular measure of the income tax rate is adopted because it can be argued that it not only 
is an actual income tax rate but it also potentially reflects to some degree the extent to which the 
income tax rate schedule at any point in time is progressive. 
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the limited ability for the IRS to directly verify many of these itemized deductions, taxpayers filing 
their tax returns and claiming itemized deductions have an opportunity to derive direct tax benefits 
by overstating their itemized deductions. Thus, it is hypothesized that the greater the proportion of 
taxpayers who itemize their tax deductions (PCTITEM),3 the greater the degree to which itemized 
deductions are exaggerated and hence the greater the direct expected benefits of federal personal 
income tax evasion. Interestingly, this variable, which reduces taxable income, has been effectively 
ignored in the official tax evasion literature to date. 
Whereas higher income tax rates and the opportunity to claim exaggerated itemized 
deductions can yield expected direct tangible benefits from income tax evasion, there is at least one 
course of action that can tangibly reduce the expected direct benefits of income tax evasion. 
Moreover, it is a legal course of action, namely, it is legal tax avoidance. One avenue through 
which this course of action is made possible is the existence of the municipal bond market, where 
qualified bonds issued by cities, counties, and states in the U.S. pay interest that is free from federal 
income taxation to the owners of record of such bonds.4 In particular, following Cebula (2004), it 
can be argued that the greater the ratio of tax free interest rate yield on high grade municipals 
relative to taxable interest rate yield such as that on 10-year U.S. Treasury notes, TFTEN, the 
greater the benefits of tax avoidance, which is legal, and hence the lower the expected direct 
benefits of tax evasion, which of course is illegal.    
Thus, the expected gross direct benefits from income tax evasion are expressed as: 
 
 egb =  egb (MAXMARGTX or AVETXRATE, PCTITEM, TFTEN)   (2A) 
 
B. Expected Secondary Benefits of Under-Reporting Taxable Income 
 
Aside from the issues of tax rates and itemization of deductions, persons who have taxable income 
may be able in certain cases to derive secondary benefits from income tax evasion behavior, i.e., 
from under-reporting taxable income. For example, if people disapprove of the way in which the 
federal government is spending their tax dollars, they may be angered or frustrated. To relieve this 
anger and/or frustration, they may consider income tax evasion as a means of expressing this anger 
and/or frustration (Feige, 1994).  
Consider the case of the U.S. military being engaged in an unpopular war. For example, there is 
empirical evidence (Feige, 1994; Cebula, 2001) that the unpopularity of the Vietnam War so 
angered the public that many chose to underreport their income and/or exaggerate their itemized tax 
deductions. This form of income tax evasion behavior was undertaken because of the disapproval 
by much of the U.S. public of the U.S. involvement in and expenditures to finance the Vietnam 
War using their tax dollars. As the Vietnam War raged on, at least some portion of the public 
received secondary benefits/gains from the experience that they were withholding financing of that 
military action.         
Similarly, it is hypothesized in the present study that the U.S. military involvement in Iraq, i.e., 
                     
3 Instead of claiming the “standard deduction.” 
4 In states which impose a state income tax, there is an exemption from those state taxes for 
state residents purchasing qualified tax-exempt bonds issued within that state (the so-called “dual 
exemption”). 
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the War in Iraq (IRAQWAR), that began in 2003 and was still raging on through and beyond the end 
of the study period for the present paper, quickly became very unpopular with the U.S. populace as 
a whole. Indeed, Cebula, Cook, and Issa (2007) found strong empirical evidence that, unlike the 
(brief) war involving not only the U.S. and Iraq but also numerous others nations that took place in 
1991 and invoked immense patriotism (and approval) within the U.S., the War in Iraq that began in 
2003 very quickly became very unpopular with a large percentage of the U.S. population. Hence, 
the latter War in Iraq is hypothesized here to have created a circumstance for people to express their 
dis-satisfaction by engaging in a greater degree of income tax evasion that yielded them a 
“secondary gain.”  
Thus, the expected gross direct and secondary benefits from income tax evasion are expressed 
as the following: 
 
egb =  egb (MAXMARGTX or AVETXRATE, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR)  (2B)  
 
C. A Control Variable: The Tax Reform Act of 1986  
 
In 1987, Musgrave observed (1987, p. 59), “The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is the most sweeping 
reform since the early 1940s…” Indeed, the TRA (Tax Reform Act) did introduce a number of 
reforms, many of which are outlined in broad terms in Barth (1991), Barth and Brumbaugh (1992), 
Ott and Vegari (2003), and Sanger, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1990). For example, as observed in Ott 
and Vegari (2003, p. 279), “The Act introduced major cuts in the personal tax rate. When fully 
effective (1988), only two tax brackets set at 15 and 28 percent, were to replace the 14 bracket tax 
schedule with rates in the range of 11 to 50 percent...[while it] broadened the tax base by reducing 
the itemized deduction.” Furthermore, as Barth (1991, pp. 45, 124) observes, among other things, 
that under the TRA the 10 percent investment tax credit for the purchase of equipment was repealed, 
and the “life” of the investment was increased for depreciation purposes.5 Thus, it is hypothesized 
here that at the time the TRA was being enacted and being fully implemented (1986-1987), there 
were many complex and new provisions added to the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. Consequently, 
taxpayers in general, including would–be as well as “repeat” tax evaders, were unfamiliar with all 
of the sweeping changes in IRS policies. It logically follows that not only honest taxpayers but also 
those contemplating or planning on income tax evasion required time to climb the “learning curve” 
associated with the TRA, resulting in at least some temporary dimunition of the aggregate degree of 
federal personal income tax evasion. Indeed, the idea that this reaction to the TRA might be only 
temporary was originally revealed in the words of Slemrod (1992, p. 45), who some years ago 
argued that it would take at least some time for taxpayers “…to learn about and adjust to the new 
law [the TRA].” In any case, it is hypothesized here that, for the period when the TRA was initially 
implemented, 1986, through the year the TRA became “de facto fully effective,” 1987 (Barth, 1991; 
Barth and Brumbaugh, 1992; Cebula, Coombs, and Yang, 2009), the value of egb was reduced. 
Accordingly, (2B) above is replaced by (3): 
 
                     
5The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was actually signed into law by President Reagan in October, 1986.  
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egb =  egb (MAXMARGTX or AVETXRATE, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR, TRA)      (3) 
 
D. Expected Gross Costs of Under-Reporting Taxable Income      
 
The expected gross costs of not reporting or under-reporting taxable income to the IRS and/or of 
reporting exaggerated itemized deductions to the IRS are hypothesized to be an increasing function 
of the expected risks/costs thereof (Pestieau, Possen and Slutsky, 1994; Erard and Feinstein, 1994; 
Caballe and Panades, 1997). In this study, to the representative economic agent, the expected 
risks/costs from underreporting taxable income to the IRS are enhanced by an increase in AUDIT, 
the percentage of filed federal personal income tax returns that is formally audited by IRS 
examiners/personnel, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the experience of an IRS tax audit could imply non-
pecuniary ("psychic") costs (such as psychological stress) as well as direct pecuniary costs 
(including outlays for attorneys and/or other representation such as accountants or financial 
advisors, along with the value of one's own time) above and beyond any potential added taxes, 
penalties, and interest assessed by the IRS. Hence, this study adopts the probability of a formal 
audit as a measure of risk to the would-be tax evader. In addition, IRS penalty assessments on 
detected unreported income are also adopted as a measure of the risks/costs associated with tax 
evasion. In particular, the greater the average penalty assessed by the IRS per audited tax return 
(PEN), the greater the expected costs of tax evasion, ceteris paribus. 
Hence, the expected gross costs of engaging in income tax evasion at the aggregate level is 
represented in this study by:  
 egc = egc (AUDIT, PEN))        (4) 
 
E. The Synthesized Model  
 
To express the full model, simply requires substituting from equations (3) and (4) into equation (1), 
yielding:  
 
pur/(1-pur) = f(MAXMARGTX or AVETXRATE, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR, TRA,  
AUDIT, PEN)         (5) 
 
 Let AGI represent the actual total value of the aggregate federal adjusted gross income in 
the economy, i.e., AGI=UAGI+RAGI, where UAGI is the dollar size of the unreported aggregate 
federal adjusted gross income in the economy,6 and RAGI is the dollar size of the reported 
aggregate federal adjusted gross income in the economy. It logically follows that the relative 
degree of aggregate income tax evasion can be expressed as: (pur)/(1-pur) = UAGI/RAGI. Thus, it 
follows that equation (5) can be replaced by equation (6): 
 
UAGI/RAGI = f (MAXMARGTX or AVETXRATE, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR, TRA,  
AUDIT, PEN)         (6) 
 
                     
6 For an explanation of how unreported adjusted gross income is calculated using the General 
Currency Ratio model, see Feige (2009) and Cebula and Feige (2012). 
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Equation (6) constitutes the foundation for the empirical model considered in the next Section of 
this study.7 
  
III.  Empirical Analysis 
a. The Empirical Model  
  
Based on the framework provided in equation (6) above, the following reduced-form 
equations are to be estimated initially:8 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)t = a0 + a1 MAXMARGTXt-1 + a2 PCTITEMt-1 + a3 TFTENt-1 + a4  TRAt 
 + a5 IRAQWARt + a6 AUDITt-1   + a7 PENt-1 + u’         (7) 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)t = b0 + b1 AVETXRATEt-1 + b2 PCTITEMt-1 + b3 TFTENt-1 + b4  TRAt  
 + b5 IRAQWARt + b6 AUDITt-1   + b7 PENt-1 + u”     (8)   
where:  
(UAGI/RAGI)t = the ratio of the aggregate unreported federal adjusted gross income in year t to 
the aggregate reported federal adjusted gross income in year t, expressed as a percent; 
a0 , b0 = constant terms; 
MAXMARGTXt-1 = the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate in year t-1, expressed as 
a percent; 
AVETXRATEt-1 = the average effective marginal federal personal income tax rate in year t-1, 
expressed as a percent;  
PCTITEMt-1 = the percentage of federal personal income tax returns that included Schedule A, 
itemizing deductions, in year t-1; 
TFTENt-1 = the ratio of the average nominal interest rate yield on high grade tax free municipal 
bonds in year t-1 to the average nominal interest rate yield on 10-year Treasury notes in year t-1, 
expressed as a percentage; 
IRAQWARt = a binary (dummy) variable for the years 2003-2008 of the study period during which 
the U.S. was involved in an unpopular war, i.e., the War in Iraq (“Operation Iraqi Freedom”): 
IRAQWARt = 1 for the years 2003-2008 and IRAQWARt = 0 otherwise;  
TRAt = a binary (dummy) variable for the years 1986 and 1987: TRAt = 1 for the years 1986, 1987 
and TRAt =0 otherwise; 
AUDITt-1 = the percentage of filed federal personal income tax returns in year t-1 that was subjected 
to a formal IRS audit involving IRS examiners;  
PENt-1 = IRS imposed penalties plus interest on detected unreported income in year t-1, expressed 
as a percent of per capita real GDP in year t-1; and  
                     
7 Clearly, UAGI = (pur)*AGI  and RAGI = (1-pur)*AGI. It then follows that:  
UAGI/RAGI = (pur)*AGI/(1-pur)*AGI = (pur)/(1-pur). Substitution of UAGI/RAGI for pur/(1-pur) 
in (5) yields: UAGI/RAGI = f(MAXMARGTX or AVETXRATE, PCTITEM, TFTEN, TRA, 
IRAQWAR, AUDIT, PEN), which is equation (6).  
8 Cebula (2011) includes variables reflecting public dissatisfaction with government and the 
opportunity cost of tax compliance but overlooks the variables PCTITEM and AVETXRATE and 
measures PEN differently from this study, i.e., in terms of the average penalty per audited return. 
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u’, u” = stochastic error terms.  
The study period runs from 1975 through 2008, reflecting availability of the data used, in 
particular, for the variables PCTITEM and PEN, in the analysis. The data are annual. For the 
interested reader, descriptive statistics for the study period for each of the variables are found in 
Table 1 of this study. Note that the number of observations is only 33 due to data limitations; 
clearly a larger N would be preferable, but more recent data on the dependent variable is currently 
unavailable. A group unit root test (which assumes a common unit root process) reveals that the 
variables in the model represented in equation (7) are stationary in levels over the study period; 
similarly, a group unit root test reveals that the variables in the model represented in equation (8) 
are stationary in levels over the study period as well.9 
The series adopted to measure income tax evasion, in this case represented by the variable 
(UAGI/RAGI), were obtained from Cebula and Feige (2012).10 Based on the General Currency 
Ratio (GCR) model, Cebula and Feige (2012, Table B-2) provide estimates of the ratio of aggregate 
unreported adjusted gross income to aggregate reported adjusted gross income. These data are 
provided in Table 2 of the present study. The data for MAXMARGTX and AVETXRATE were 
obtained from the Internal Revenue Service (2010, Table 6). The AUDIT, PCTITEM, and PEN data 
were obtained from the Government Accounting Office (1996: Table I.1) and the U.S. Census 
Bureau (1994, Table 519; 1998, Table 550; 1999, Table 556; 2001, Table 546; 2010, Table 469). 
The data for the variable TFTEN were obtained from the Council of Economic Advisors (2013, 
Table B-73). The IRAQWAR and TRA variables are binary (dummy) variables.  
 
b. The Initial Estimation Results: The Linear Specification 
 
The OLS estimation of equations (7) and (8) in linear form are provided in columns (a) and 
(b), respectively, in Table 3; in both cases, the Newey and West (1987) heteroskedatsicity 
correction was adopted.11 In column (a), all seven of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected 
signs. Four of these estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, and two are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.72, so that the 
model explains approximately seven-tenths of the variation in the independent variable. Based on 
the DW and Rho statistics, there is no concern regarding autocorrelation. Finally, the F-statistic is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, attesting to the overall strength of the model. 
According to the results provided column (a) of Table 3, the coefficient on the maximum 
marginal federal personal income tax rate variable (MAXMARGTX) is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Thus, the higher the maximum marginal federal personal income tax 
rate, the greater the extent of that income tax evasion. This finding is consistent with several 
previous empirical studies of income tax evasion (Tanzi, 1982; Clotfelter, 1983; Crane and 
Nourzad, 1987; Poterba, 1987; Feige, 1994; Joulaian and Rider, 1996; Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett, 
2001; Cebula, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2011, 2013). As observed above, the sign on the partial derivative 
of income tax evasion with respect to (in this case) the maximum marginal federal personal income 
                     
9
 These results will be supplied upon e-mail request. 
10 See also Feige (2009); the GCR model actually refers to underreported taxable income. 
11 Testing for heteroskedasticity revealed a need to make such a correction in all of the 
estimations in this study. 
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tax rate, theoretically depends upon the relative strengths of the substitution effect on the one hand 
and the income effect on the other hand associated with the tax rate change. The finding in column 
(a), of an in itself, would seem to imply that, for the representative taxpayer, the substitution effect, 
which is always positive, outweighs the income effect (be it positive or negative). And as Freire-
Seren and Panades (2013, p. 810) observe, “This effect [the substitution effect] generates incentives 
to substitute tax evasion for honesty.” But of course this is but one finding in one estimation. 
The estimated coefficient on the PCTITEM variable is positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% level. This finding implies that the greater the percentage of taxpayers that itemizes their 
personal deductions (on Schedule A of Form 1040), the greater the degree to which taxable income 
is underreported and hence the greater the degree of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion. 
This finding has effectively not been formally researched in the tax evasion literature to date.  
The estimated coefficient on the tax free/taxable interest rate variable, TFTEN, is negative, 
as hypothesized, and statistically significant at the 1% level, providing compelling empirical 
evidence that the greater the rewards for legal tax avoidance (as measured here), the less the 
aggregate degree of illegal personal income tax evasion. This finding is consistent with Cebula 
(2004), who first proposed and tested this hypothesis, albeit with data running only through the year 
1997.  
Consistent with the arguments in Musgrave (1987) and findings in Cebula, Coombs and 
Yang (2009) and Cebula (2011), the results for TRA variable are compelling. In particular, the 
estimated coefficient on variable TRA is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, 
there is evidence that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is shown to have reduced federal personal 
income tax evasion in the U.S., albeit only briefly. Given the specification of TRA as applying to the 
short-term period of just 1986 and 1987, these results would seem to confirm the arguments in 
Slemrod (1992) and the findings in Cebula, Coombs and Yang (2009), who also argue that it would 
take at least some time for taxpayers to understand the revisions in the Internal Revenue Code and 
to adjust to those revisions. 
The estimated coefficient on the IRAQWAR dummy is positive and statistically significant 
at the 4% level, which is consistent with the hypothesis proffered above that an unpopular war 
elicits a reduction in income tax compliance. This behavior arguably reflects a “secondary gain” 
from income tax evasion.   
Next, there is the audit rate (by IRS examiners) variable. As shown in the first column of 
Table 3, the estimated coefficient on this variable is negative and statistically significant at 1% 
level. Thus, it appears that the audit rate variable (AUDIT), of and in itself, may be viewed as a 
deterrent to federal personal income taxation. This finding is consistent with previous  studies such 
as Pestieau, Possen and Slutsky (1994), Erard and Feinstein (1994), and Caballe and Panades 
(1997), who suggest that IRS policies such as a higher audit rate by IRS personnel impose a variety 
of costs, both pecuniary and psychic, that act to dissuade income tax evasion behavior.  
Finally, the estimated coefficient for the IRS penalty variable, PENt-1, is negative, as 
expected; however, it is not statistically significant at even the 10% level. Thus, in this linear 
estimate, the evidence implies that higher levels of IRS imposed penalties and interest do not 
materially act to discourage federal personal income tax evasion.   
In column (b) of Table 3, the OLS estimate of equation (8) is provided. This estimate differs 
in construct from that in equation (7) only insofar as it adopts an alternative measure of the 
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aggregate income tax rate structure, namely, AVETXRATEt-1. In column (b), all seven of the 
estimated coefficients exhibit the hypothesized signs, with two statistically significant at the 1% 
level, one statistically significant at the 5% level, and three statistically significant at the 10% level; 
hence, these results appear to be somewhat less robust than those in column (a). The coefficient of 
determination is 0.70, so that the model in equation (7) explains approximately seven-tenths of the 
variation in the dependent variable. Once again autocorrelation is not a problem. Finally, the F-
statistic is statistically significant at the 1% level, as its counterpart in column (a) was. 
According to the results in column (b) of Table 3, the coefficient on the average effective 
federal personal income tax rate variable (AVETXRATE) is positive but statistically significant at 
only the 8% level. Thus, there is evidence, but not terribly compelling evidence, that the higher the 
average effective federal personal income tax rate, the greater the expected benefits of tax evasion 
and hence the greater the extent of that income tax evasion. This finding is arguably inconsistent 
with several previous empirical studies (Tanzi, 1982; Clotfelter, 1983; Crane and Nourzad, 1987; 
Poterba, 1987; Feige, 1994; Joulaian and Rider, 1996; Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett, 2001; Cebula, 
1997, 2001, 2004, 2011, 2013), which found more compelling evidence that higher income tax 
rates elicit higher income tax evasion. As observed above, in the aggregate, for the representative 
taxpayer, the sign on the partial derivative of income tax evasion with respect to, in this case, the 
average effective federal personal income tax rate, theoretically depends upon the relative strengths 
of the substitution effect associated with the tax rate change on the one hand and the income effect 
associated with the tax rate change on the other hand. The finding in column (b), of an in itself, 
does not convincingly imply that the substitution effect, which is always positive, outweighs the 
income effect (be it positive or negative). Indeed, the failure of this estimated coefficient to be 
statistically significant at the 5% level, potentially could be interpreted as implying that the impact 
of a higher income tax rate (as measured by variable AVETXRATE) on income tax evasion is 
ambiguous, depending upon whether statistical significance at the 8% level is considered robust 
enough to deduce something resembling a clear positive impact of tax rates on tax evasion. 
Nevertheless, based on this result in Table 3, one must be cautious about accepting or rejecting this 
inference. Results shown in Table 4 are relevant to this issue. 
In column (b), the estimated coefficient on the PCTITEM variable is positive and 
statistically significant at beyond the 10% level. This finding implies, although un-compellingly, 
that the greater the percentage of taxpayers that itemizes their personal deductions (on Schedule A 
of Form 1040), the greater the degree to which taxable income is underreported and hence the 
greater the degree of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion.  
The estimated coefficient on the tax free/taxable interest rate variable, TFTEN, is negative, 
as hypothesized, and statistically significant at the 1% level, providing additional empirical 
evidence (along with the counterpart finding shown in column (a)) that the greater the rewards for 
legal tax avoidance (as measured here), the less the aggregate degree of illegal personal income tax 
evasion.  
Consistent with the arguments in Musgrave (1987) and findings in Cebula, Coombs and 
Yang (2009), the results for TRA variable are compelling. In particular, in column (b), the estimated 
coefficient on variable TRA is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, there is 
further evidence that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced federal personal income tax evasion in 
the U.S., albeit only briefly. As observed above, given the specification of TRA as applying to just 
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1986 and 1987, these results would seem to confirm the argument in Slemrod (1992) and the later 
findings by Cebula, Coombs and Yang (2009), who also argued that it would take at least some 
time for taxpayers to understand the many revisions in the Internal Revenue Code and to adjust to 
those revisions. 
Unlike the finding for this variable in column (a), the estimated coefficient on the 
IRAQWAR dummy is positive and statistically significant at only the 8% level, which is “weakly” 
consistent with the hypothesis proffered above that an unpopular war elicits a reduction in income 
tax compliance. This behavior implies, but not strongly, that the unpopularity if the War in Iraq 
provided a “secondary gain” for taxpayers from income tax evasion.  
Next, there is the audit rate (by IRS examiners) variable. As shown in column (b), the 
estimated coefficient on this variable is negative and statistically significant at 3% level. Thus, it 
once again appears that the audit rate variable (AUDIT) may be viewed as a deterrent to federal 
personal income taxation. This finding is consistent with the result in column (a) and with previous 
studies such as Pestieau, Possen and Slutsky (1994), Erard and Feinstein (1994), and Caballe and 
Panades (1997), who suggests that IRS policies such as a higher audit rate by IRS personnel 
impose a variety of costs, both pecuniary and psychic, that act to dissuade income tax evasion 
behavior.  
Finally, the estimated coefficient for the IRS penalty variable is negative, as expected; 
however, as found to be the case in column (a) on Table 3, it is not statistically significant at the 
10% level. Thus, in this linear estimate, the evidence implies that higher levels of IRS imposed 
penalties and interest do not measurably act to discourage federal personal income tax evasion.  
 
c. Alternative Estimation Results: The Log-log Specification 
 
In this sub-section of the study, the results of estimating the models in equations (7) and (8) in log-
log form are provided in columns (a) and (b) of Table 4. Once again, it is noted that the Newey and 
West (1987) heteroskedatsicity correction was adopted in both estimates. In column (a) of Table 4, 
all seven of the estimated elasticity/coefficient values exhibit the expected signs, with three 
statistically significant at the 1% level and two statistically significant at the 5% level. The F-
statistic is statistically significant at the 1% level, and the R2 value is 0.73, so that the model 
explains in excess of seven-tenths of the variation in the dependent variable. 
 According to the results provided column (a) of Table 4, the coefficient/elasticity on the 
maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate variable (MAXMARGTX) is positive but it fails 
to be statistically significant at even the 10% level. This finding is inconsistent with several 
previous empirical studies of income tax evasion (Tanzi, 1982; Clotfelter, 1983; Crane and 
Nourzad, 1987; Poterba, 1987; Feige, 1994; Joulaian and Rider, 1996; Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett, 
2001; Cebula, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2011, 2013), as well as the results in column (a) of Table 3 (and, 
arguably column (b) of Table 3) in this study, which found higher tax rates to elicit increased tax 
evasion. As observed above, for the representative taxpayer, the sign on the partial derivative of tax 
evasion with respect to, in this case, an increase in the maximum marginal federal income tax rate, 
theoretically depends upon the relative strengths of the substitution effect on the one hand and the 
income effect on the other hand associated with the tax rate change. The finding in column (a), of 
and in itself, would seem to imply that for the representative taxpayer the substitution effect, which 
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is always positive, merely offsets a negative income effect, so that in this estimate the impact of the 
MAXMARGTX measure of the income tax rate on tax evasion is on balance ambiguous.  
Also in column (a) of Table 4, the estimated coefficient/elasticity on the PCTITEM variable 
is positive and statistically significant at the 2.5% level. This finding implies that the greater the 
percentage of taxpayers itemizing their personal deductions (on Schedule A of Form 1040), the 
greater the degree to which taxable income is underreported and hence the greater the degree of 
aggregate federal personal income tax evasion. For example, a 1% increase in the value of 
PCTITEM would lead to a 0.491% increase in (UAGI/RAGI). 
Once again, the estimated coefficient/elasticity on the tax free/taxable interest rate variable, 
TFTEN, is negative, and statistically significant at the 1% level, providing additional compelling 
empirical evidence that the greater the rewards for legal tax avoidance (as measured), the less the 
aggregate degree of illegal personal income tax evasion (Cebula, 2004). Indeed, a 1% increase in 
the value of TFTEN would lead to a 0.633% decrease in (UAGI/RAGI). 
Consistent with arguments in Musgrave (1987), Slemrod (1992), and Cebula, Coombs and 
Yang (2009), the results for TRA variable are again robust. In particular, the estimated coefficient 
on variable TRA is again negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, there is further 
evidence that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is shown to have reduced federal personal income tax 
evasion in the U.S., albeit only briefly.  
The estimated coefficient on the IRAQWAR dummy is positive and statistically significant 
at the 3% level, which is consistent with the hypothesis that an unpopular war elicits a reduction in 
income tax compliance. This behavior arguably implies the presence of secondary gains from 
income tax evasion.   
Next, there is the audit rate (by IRS examiners) variable. As shown in the first column of 
Table 4, the estimated coefficient/elasticity on this variable is negative and statistically significant at 
1% level. Thus, there appears to be further evidence that the audit rate variable (AUDIT) may be 
viewed as a deterrent to federal personal income taxation. For instance, a 1% increase in the value 
of AUDIT would lead to a 0.157% decrease in (UAGI/RAGI). Finally, the estimated 
coefficient/elasticity for the IRS penalty variable, PENt-1, is once again negative; however, it is not 
statistically significant at even the 10% level. Thus, in this log-log estimate, the evidence implies 
that higher levels of IRS imposed penalties and interest do not act to discourage federal personal 
income tax evasion.  
In column (b) of Table 4, all seven of the estimated elasticity/coefficient values exhibit the 
expected signs, with three statistically significant at the 1% level and two statistically significant at 
the 10% level. The F-statistic is statistically significant at the 1% level, and the R2 value is 0.74, so 
that the model explains nearly three-fourths of the variation in the dependent variable. 
 According to the results provided column (a) of Table 4, the coefficient on the average 
effective federal personal income tax rate variable (AVETXRATE) is positive but it fails to be 
statistically significant at even the 10% level. This finding also is inconsistent with several previous 
empirical studies of income tax evasion (Tanzi, 1982; Clotfelter, 1983; Crane and Nourzad, 1987; 
Poterba, 1987; Feige, 1994; Joulaian and Rider, 1996; Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett, 2001; Cebula, 
1997, 2001, 2004, 2011, 2013), as well as the results in column (a) of Table 3 (and, arguably 
column (b) of Table 3) in this study, which found higher tax rates to elicit increased tax evasion. As 
observed above, for the representative taxpayer, the sign on the partial derivative of tax evasion 
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with respect to, in this case, the average effective federal income tax rate, theoretically depends 
upon the relative strengths of the substitution effect on the one hand and the income effect on the 
other hand associated with the tax rate change. The finding in column (a), of and in itself, would 
seem to imply that for the representative taxpayer the substitution effect, which is always positive, 
merely offsets a negative income effect, so that the impact of the AVETXRATE measure of the 
income tax rate on tax evasion is, on balance, ambiguous.  
Also in column (b) of Table 4, the estimated elasticity on the PCTITEM variable is positive 
and statistically significant at the 6% level. Arguably, this finding implies that the greater the 
percentage of taxpayers that itemizes their personal deductions (on Schedule A of Form 1040), the 
greater the degree to which taxable income is underreported and hence the greater the degree of 
aggregate federal personal income tax evasion. This outcome is effectively consistent with our three 
previous results for this variable.  For example, a 1% increase in the value of PCTITEM would 
presumably lead to a 0.48% increase in (UAGI/RAGI). 
Once again, the estimated elasticity on the tax free/taxable interest rate variable, TFTEN, is 
negative, and statistically significant at the 1% level, providing additional compelling empirical 
evidence that the greater the rewards for legal tax avoidance (as measured), the less the aggregate 
degree of illegal personal income tax evasion. Indeed, a 1% increase in the value of TFTEN would 
apparently lead to a 0.604% decrease in (UAGI/RAGI). 
The results for TRA variable are once again robust. In particular, the estimated coefficient 
on variable TRA is again negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, there is further 
evidence that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is shown to have reduced federal personal income tax 
evasion in the U.S., albeit only briefly. 
The estimated coefficient on the IRAQWAR dummy is positive and statistically significant 
at the 9% level, which is modestly supportive of the hypothesis that an unpopular war elicits a 
reduction in income tax compliance through a secondary gain from income tax evasion.   
Next, there is the audit rate (by IRS examiners) variable. As shown in the first column of 
Table 3, the estimated coefficient/elasticity on this variable is yet again negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level. Thus, there appears to be further evidence that the audit rate variable 
(AUDIT) may be viewed as a deterrent to federal personal income taxation. For instance, a 1% 
increase in the value of AUDIT would lead to a 0.134% decrease in (UAGI/RAGI). 
 Finally, although the estimated coefficient/elasticity for the IRS penalty variable, PENt-1, is 
negative, it once again is not statistically significant at the 10% level. Thus, in this log-log estimate, 
the evidence implies that higher levels of IRS imposed penalties and interest do not dissuade federal 
personal income tax evasion.  
 
d. 2SLS Estimation Results: A Robustness Test 
 
As a test of the robustness of the results of the basic model, this sub-section of the study provides 
2SLS estimates of  the following re-specified versions of equations (7) and (8): 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)t = a0 + a1 MAXMARGTXt-1 + a2 PCTITEMt-1 + a3 TFTENt-1 + a4  TRAt 
 + a5 IRAQWARt + a6 AUDITt  + a7 PENt-1 + u’         (9) 
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(UAGI/RAGI)t = b0 + b1 AVETXRATEt-1 + b2 PCTITEMt-1 + b3 TFTENt-1 + b4  TRAt  
 + b5 IRAQWARt + b6 AUDITt   + b7 PENt-1 + u”     (10)   
 
These specifications differ from those in equations (7) and (8) insofar as the audit variable is now 
shown as un-lagged. This specification implies that the greater the current IRS audit rate, which 
might well be the case if the relevant IRS audit has been publicly announced or otherwise made 
known to the public during the tax-filing season, the greater the risk of tax evasion and hence the 
lower the current aggregate degree of tax evasion. As such, the dependent variable, (UAGI/RAGI)t, 
and the explanatory variable AUDITt   are contemporaneous. As a result of this circumstance, the 
possibility of simultaneity bias arises. To address this issue, the model in both equations is 
estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental variable adopted is the two-year lag of the federal/central 
government budget deficit expressed as a percent of GDP, DEFYt-2. The choice of this instrument is 
based on the fact that DEFYt-2 and AUDITt   are highly correlated, whereas DEFYt-2 is uncorrelated 
with the error terms in the system. 
 The 2SLS estimation of equations (9) and (10) are provided in columns (a) and (b) of Table 
5. For the most part, the non-tax rate results in this Table parallel those in Table 3, where OLS 
results for the models were reported. What is most interesting is that in column (a), the estimated 
coefficient on the tax variable MAXMARGTXt-1 is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, whereas in column (b) the estimated coefficient on the tax variable AVETXRATEt-1 is not 
statistically significant at even the 10% level. Thus, the higher the maximum marginal federal 
personal income tax rate, the greater the extent of aggregate income tax evasion; however, a higher 
average income tax rate elicits no statistically significant change in the aggregate degree of tax 
evasion. These results are consistent with the OLS estimates reported in Table 3 and imply that the 
impact of higher federal personal income tax rates is “ambiguous, i.e., it can be fairly stated that this 
exploratory study once again, this time using 2SLS, finds evidence most compatible with 
“ambiguity.” Indeed, the same conclusion is reached is equations (9) and (10) are estimated by 
2SLS in log-log form. 
 
IV. Summary and Closing Observations 
 
This exploratory empirical study of the underground economy in the U.S. examines a new and 
updated series based on the General Currency Ratio (GCR) Model on aggregate personal income 
tax evasion for the period 1975 through 2008, with 2008 being the most recent year for which 
income tax evasion data are available for the U.S. Focusing on aggregate income tax evasion and 
its determinants permits the analysis of actual (official) as opposed to hypothetical or experimental 
tax evasion figures and also permits the analysis of a variety of actual real-world explanatory 
variables; furthermore, the aggregate time-series approach adopted in this study allows analysis of 
tax evasion over time.  Finally, the use of aggregate data can provide researchers and policymakers 
with a convenient tool for estimating the lost tax revenues resulting from tax evasion and potential 
tax receipts increases that certain public policies may potentially generate. In any event, the IRS has 
data based on the AGI-gap approach; however, the most recent year for its data is 2005 (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2010, Table 6). Thus, the present study is more “contemporary” than previous 
studies using “official data.”  
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The purpose of this exploratory study is two-fold. First, adopting a cost-benefit model of 
income tax evasion decision-making, this study seeks to identify key determinants of aggregate 
federal personal income tax evasion in the U.S. using data up to and including the year 2008. 
Second, it provides a number of empirical estimates of aggregate income tax evasion that adopt 
two alternative income tax rate measures in the effort to provide information that may be 
pertinent to the controversy and debate concerning the actual net response of aggregate income tax 
evasion to, say, an income tax rate increase and the relative strengths of the substitution and income 
effects of a tax rate change. The estimates initially take the form of OLS estimates; however, as a 
test of robustness, 2SLS estimates are also provided. Both the OLS and 2SLS estimates yield the 
same conclusions regarding the impact of income tax rates on income tax evasion: ambiguity. 
 More specifically, over the study period, the principal conclusions are the following: federal 
personal income tax evasion is an increasing function of the percentage of filed federal personal 
income tax returns that itemizes deductions, and U.S. involvement in an unpopular war, in this 
case, the War in Iraq. The study also finds persistent evidence that; (a) the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
acted to (briefly) discourage tax evasion; (b) a higher IRS audit rate by IRS personnel acted to 
discourage tax evasion; and (c) the greater the benefits of legal tax avoidance, as measured by the 
ratio of the tax free interest rate yield on high grade municipals to the taxable interest rate yield on 
10-year Treasury notes, the less the degree of illegal tax evasion. By contrast, the study finds 
consistent evidence that IRS imposed penalties and interest on detected unreported income to have 
no discernible impact on aggregate personal income taxation. 
 Six different estimates addressed the impact of higher income tax rates on aggregate federal 
income tax evasion. In the linear OLS model estimates, the coefficient on the maximum marginal 
personal income tax rate was positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, whereas the 
average effective personal income tax rate while positive was statistically significant at only the 8% 
level. In the two log-log OLS estimates, both income tax rate measures were found to be 
statistically insignificant at even the 10% level. Finally, in the 2SLS estimates, the coefficient on the 
maximum marginal personal income tax rate was positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, whereas the average effective personal income tax rate, while positive, was not statistically 
significant at even the 10% level. On balance, it is unclear what the net impact of a higher income 
tax rate is.  
Given the tax rate measures considered, it would appear that there is a reasonable argument 
that can be made that the tax-evasion impact of higher income tax rates may well be ambiguous. 
However, this is but one study. The decision to engage in tax evasion is complex and difficult to 
model, especially across an entire economy with so many millions of taxpayers, each with her/his 
own utility function; indeed, behavioral patterns will also change over time both as a reflection of 
taxpayer “turnover” and changing cultural, political, and economic conditions, among other things. 
Moreover, for any given time frame, alternative specifications may yield different results than these, 
as might studies of longer time periods or studies based on experimentation. Nevertheless, it can be 
fairly stated that this exploratory study finds preliminary evidence most compatible with 
“ambiguity.”  
The findings imply, among other things, that in the pursuit of greater tax revenues, limiting 
the ability to itemize personal tax deductions may be a fruitful path to consider; indeed, it was a 
significant component of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. However, it is a path requiring careful 
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planning so as to avoid political fall-out with the taxpaying public. Obviously, avoidance of what is 
likely to be an unpopular war would be wise not only on moral, ethical, and political grounds, but 
also on the practical grounds of avoiding tax revenue losses. Finally, although increasing the IRS 
examiner audit rate may yield additional tax revenues, political pragmatism would seem to require a 
circumspect implementation of such a policy change: Draconian IRS empowerment would likely 
not be well received by the populace...  
In closing, it is observed that subsequent related research might seek to identify additional 
factors potentially influencing income tax evasion in the U.S., including the presence of 
undocumented immigrants within U.S. borders. In addition, although 2SLS estimates have been 
provided in this study, future research might undertake a more in-depth investigation of the 
possibility of simultaneity issues between tax evasion and other variables (Cebula, 2001; Alm and 
Yunus, 2009). Finally, as more current data become available over time, revisiting the issues at 
hand may yield greater insights. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable   Mean  Standard Deviation 
Period: 1975-2008: 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)    21.013  2.027 
MAXMARGTX   48.157            15.73 
AVETXRATE    13.99  1.087 
TRA      0.0513 0.224  
PCTITEM   31.863  3.692 
TFTEN   89.9            10.8 
AUDIT      1.362  0.4 
PEN       2.648 1.832 
IRAQWAR      0.181 0.381 
N = 33 
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Table 2. Data for Dependent Variable, UAGI/RAGI, by Year, 1960-2008 
 
Year UAGI/RAGI   Year UAGI/RAGI 
1960 16.10    1985 21.11 
1961 15.47    1986 18.89 
1962 15.86    1987 17.42 
1963 16.44    1988 18.74 
1964 15.88    1989 21.06 
1965 14.62    1990 21.06 
1966 14.86    1991 21.39 
1967 15.36    1992 19.04 
1968 15.21    1993 17.70 
1969 15.32    1994 17.98 
1970 16.30    1995 20.01 
1971 16.04    1996 18.64 
1972 16.16    1997 18.66 
1973 16.27    1998 18.30 
1974 17.47    1999 20.55 
1975 18.81    2000 22.29 
1976 20.17    2001 22.73 
1977 20.37    2002 23.94 
1978 20.63    2003 23.17 
1979 21.14    2004 21.57 
1980 22.84    2005 21.98 
1981 22.25    2006 23.85 
1982 22.93    2007 24.90 
1983 21.46    2008 23.94 
1984 21.86 
 
UAGI/RAGI is expressed as a percentage. Source: Cebula and Feige (2012, Table B-2, p.282). 
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Table 3. Empirical Estimates, 1975-2008, OLS 
 
Dependent Variable: (UAGI/RAGI)  
   (a)    (b)    
Specification: Linear      
MAXMARGTX  0.07***  --------       
   (3.69)    
 
AVETXRATE  --------   0.616* 
      (1.81) 
 
PCTITEM  0.27**   0.292*    
   (2.07)   (1.72)    
 
TFTEN  -12.4***  -11.88***   
   (-3.81)   (-4.14)    
 
TRA   -4.313***  -4.292***   
   (-4.22)   (-4.62)    
 
AUDIT   -3.223***  -1.872**   
   (-4.29)   (-2.37)    
 
PEN   -0.218   -0.302 
   (-1.22)   (-1.30) 
 
IRAQWAR  2.328**  3.39* 
   (2.27)   (1.85) 
 
Constant  24.81   16.43 
 
R2   0.72   0.70    
AdjR2   0.64   0.61    
F   8.78***  8.02***   
DW   1.76   1.72    
Rho   0.12   0.14    
 
Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; **indicates 
statistical significance at the 5% level; *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 23 
Table 4. Empirical Estimates, 1975-2008, OLS 
 
Dependent Variable: log (UAGI/RAGI) 
   (a)    (b)    
Specification: (Log-Log) 
logMAXMARGTX 0.059   -------- 
   (1.03) 
 
logAVETXRATE --------   0.303     
      (1.07)    
 
logPCTITEM  0.491**  0.48*    
   (2.40)   (1.95)    
 
logTFTEN  -0.633***  -0.604***   
   (-3.65)   (-3.85)    
 
TRA   -0.201***  -0.204***   
   (-4.52)   (-5.21)    
 
logAUDIT  -0.157***  -0.1604***   
   (-5.59)   (-3.19)  
 
logPEN  -0.028   -0.033 
   (-1.05)   (-1.20) 
 
IRAQWAR  0.103**  0.145* 
   (2.37)   (1.77) 
 
Constant  1.085   0.539 
 
 
R2   0.73   0.74   
AdjR2   0.65   0.66    
F   9.16***  9.51***   
DW   1.82   1.93    
Rho   0.08   0.03  
 
 
Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; **indicates 
statistical significance at the 5% level; *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.  
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Table 5. Empirical Estimates, 1975-2008, 2SLS 
 
Dependent Variable: (UAGI/RAGI)  
   (a)    (b)    
Specification: Linear      
MAXMARGTX  0.156***  --------       
   (3.30)    
 
AVETXRATE  --------   0.448 
      (0.63) 
 
PCTITEM  0.005   0.244*    
   (0.04)   (1.72)    
 
TFTEN  -19.7***  -27.8***   
   (-2.76)   (-3.09)    
 
TRA   -3.69***  -3.37***   
   (-3.96)   (-4.01)    
 
AUDIT   -7.67***  -6.14**   
   (-2.92)   (-2.57)    
 
PEN   -0.02   -0.47* 
   (-0.10)   (-2.00) 
 
IRAQWAR  4.49***  4.50** 
   (3.47)   (2.13) 
 
Constant  40.42   39.93 
 
F   5.00***  3.97***   
DW   1.74   1.80    
Rho   0.13   0.10    
 
Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; **indicates 
statistical significance at the 5% level; *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.  
   
